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Article	50	does	allow	Britain	to	negotiate	a
transitional	period
Theresa	May	intends	to	negotiate	a	transitional	period	after	March	2019,	during	which
people,	businesses	and	services	would	have	time	to	adapt	to	Brexit	while	the	current
regulatory	framework	is	maintained.	But	it	is	still	unclear	how	Britain	will	do
this.	Federico	Ortino	and	Holger	Hestermeyer	argue	that	as	far	as	the	legal	picture	is
concerned,	Article	50	does	allow	the	UK	to	postpone	the	beginning	of	the	withdrawal
agreement	until	a	later	date,	giving	the	government	valuable	time	to	implement	Brexit.
Campo	Marzio,	Rome…	not	built	in	a	day.	Credit:	Irina	Koryagina	(CC	BY-SA	2.0)
Ever	since	the	EU	referendum	took	place,	the	British	government’s	stance	on	implementing	the	vote	has	followed
two	apparently	conflicting	approaches:	principles	and	pragmatism.	The	former	is	evidenced	most	clearly	in	the
drawing,	relatively	quickly,	of	the	so-called	red	lines	(including	control	over	immigration,	law-making,	trade	policy
and	freedom	from	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	EU).	These	red	lines	have	remained	relatively
unchanged	–	notwithstanding	the	various	calls	to	modify	(and	particularly	to	soften)	them.
Pragmatism,	on	the	other	hand,	finds	its	most	emphatic	expression	in	the	British	government’s	attempt	to	keep
the	post-Brexit	world	as	much	as	possible	unchanged	compared	to	the	pre-Brexit	one	(save,	of	course,	for	exiting
the	EU	based	on	the	red	lines	mentioned	above).	This	pragmatism	is	a	function	of	the	need	to	(a)	alleviate	the
complexity	of	the	government’s	task	to	actually	implement	Brexit	in	a	short	period	of	time	and	(b)	reassure
business	that	there	will	be	no	dramatic	changes	in	the	regulatory	framework	under	which	they	currently	operate.
A	good	example	of	this	pragmatism	is	the	EU	(Withdrawal)	Bill,	which	aims	to	reproduce	all	existing	EU	legislation
into	domestic	UK	law	to	ensure	continuity	and	a	smooth	transition	on	the	day	the	UK	leaves	the	EU.	Similarly,
pragmatism	can	be	observed	in	the	key	policy	choices	so	far	undertaken	by	the	British	government	with	regard	to
trade	policy	(and	most	recently	confirmed	in	the	DIT	policy	paper	“Preparing	for	our	future	UK	trade	policy”).
These	include:
Continuing	membership	of	the	WTO	based	on	commitments	that	mirror	as	much	as	possible	those	currently
applicable	to	the	UK	as	a	member	of	the	EU.
Ensuring	that	existing	EU	free	trade	agreements	with	third	countries	will	continue	to	be	applicable	(at	least
on	an	interim	basis)	between	the	UK	and	those	third	countries	following	Brexit.
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Pragmatism	also	underlies	the	Prime	Minister’s	recognition	of	the	need	for	a	period	of	implementation	(or
transition)	in	order	“to	adjust	to	the	new	arrangements	in	a	smooth	and	orderly	way”.	In	line	with	that	pragmatism,
the	Prime	Minister’s	current	thinking	with	regard	to	the	kind	of	transitional	mechanism	appeared	to	be	aimed	at
‘simply’	prolonging	the	current	regulatory	framework	for	a	(limited)	period	of	time:	“a	period	of	standstill”,	in	the
words	of	the	Prime	Minister	in	her	Florence	speech.	This	period	of	standstill	would	have	the	added	advantage
that	people,	businesses	and	public	services	would	only	need	to	confront	one	set	of	changes	–	namely	the	one
after	the	end	of	the	standstill	period.
Accordingly,	in	an	ideal	scenario,	by	29	March	2019,	the	UK	and	the	EU	would	have	been	able	to	agree	on	(a)
the	withdrawal	agreement	(concerning	in	particular	the	rights	of	EU	nationals,	the	Irish	border	and	the	divorce
bill)	and	(b)	the	heads	of	terms	of	the	future	long-term	relationship,	described	in	Article	50	TEU	as	the	“framework
for	its	future	relationship	with	the	Union”.	The	period	of	standstill	would	then	give	everyone	the	time	to	adjust	to
the	post-Brexit	world.	We	do	recognise,	however,	that	there	is	uncertainty	surrounding	the	issue	of	a	transition
period:	in	a	statement	to	the	Commons,	the	Prime	Minister	seems	to	have	changed	her	approach	to	transition,
stating	that	the	transition	is	supposed	to	be	a	time	period	for	implementing	the	future	relationship	and	thus	without
a	deal	in	place,	there	would	be	no	need	for	such	an	implementation	period.
When	it	comes	to	actually	devising	a	transitional	framework,	several	options	have	been	put	forward.	One	is
rejoining	EFTA	and	operating	under	the	EEA.	Another	is	to	establish	an	interim	association	agreement.	A
third	would	extend	the	negotiating	period	beyond	29	March	2019.	We	want	to	suggest	one	further	option	that	has
not	yet	been	fully	considered.	It	is	based	on	a	textual	and	purposive	interpretation	of	Article	50(3)	TFEU.
Article	50(3)	provides	that	“[t]he	Treaties	shall	cease	to	apply	to	the	State	in	question	from	the	date	of	entry	into
force	of	the	withdrawal	agreement	or,	failing	that,	two	years	after	the	notification	referred	to	in	paragraph	2	[unless
the	period	is	extended]”.	Our	suggestion	is	that	the	agreement	on	withdrawal	reached	by	29	March	2019	(at	the
latest)	will	expressly	specify	that	its	entry	into	force	will	take	place	at	a	later	date	(say,	two	years	later,	on	29
March	2021).	This	would	have	several	practical	and	political	implications:
By	postponing	its	entry	into	force,	the	status	quo	is	preserved	for	the	chosen	period	of	time.
At	least	formally,	it	would	be	subject	only	to	a	qualified	majority	vote	in	the	Council	and	consent	of	the
European	Parliament.
While	Brexit	Day	would	be	effectively	postponed,	withdrawal	from	the	EU	would	have	been	finalised,	so	that
at	least	that	part	of	the	negotiations	would	be	over.
It	would	provide	additional	time	to	finalise	the	details	of	the	future,	more	complex	relationship	(including
ratification	by	EU	Member	States).
We	acknowledge	that	the	solution	we	propose	hardly	resolves	all	the	problems	raised	by	the	transition	period.
Crucially,	it	does	not	resolve	the	issue	of	institutional	representation	of	the	UK	in	the	EU	during	the	transition
period.	Under	our	approach	the	treaties	would	continue	in	force	until	the	entry	into	force	of	the	withdrawal
agreement	–	and	accordingly,	the	UK	would	need	to	organise	elections	for	the	European	Parliament	in	2019	(and,
of	course,	continue	to	be	represented	in	the	Commission,	the	Court	of	Justice	and	other	organs).
To	resolve	this	issue,	the	EU	and	the	UK	would	have	to	find	a	more	thorough,	bespoke	solution	in	the	withdrawal
agreement	and	provide	for	its	entry	into	force.	This,	however,	comes	with	its	own	difficulties	as	it	is	unclear	to
what	extent	Art.	50	TEU	can	serve	as	a	legal	basis	for	a	bespoke	transition	agreement.	A	fully-fledged	or	interim
association	agreement	based	on	Art.	218	TFEU,	however,	requires	procedures	that	could	not	be	done	within	the
remaining	timeframe.	Accordingly,	moving	away	from	the	status	quo	may	bring	about	legal	and	political	difficulties
that	it	might	not	be	possible	to	overcome	in	time.	Pragmatism	will	(need	to)	dictate	the	extent	of	this	tinkering,	if
any.
Does	the	option	suggested	here	conform	with	Article	50(3)?	We	believe	it	does.	The	crucial	question	is	how	one
interprets	‘failing	that’	in	the	first	sentence:	“The	Treaties	shall	cease	to	apply	to	the	State	in	question	from	the
date	of	entry	into	force	of	the	withdrawal	agreement	or,	failing	that,	two	years	after	the	notification…”	There	seem
to	be	two	ways	to	read	the	reference	of	“failing	that”.	On	the	one	hand	it	could	mean	“in	case	the	parties	do	not
reach	a	withdrawal	agreement”.	On	the	other	it	could	be	read	as	“in	case	a	withdrawal	agreement	does	not	come
into	force	within	two	years	of	notification”.
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The	second	reading	imposes	a	strict	deadline:	the	treaties	end	two	years	after	notification	(on	29	March	2019).
Any	withdrawal	agreement	must	come	into	force	before	that	date	or	else	there	would	be	a	“gap”	between	the
treaties	losing	force	and	the	withdrawal	agreement	coming	into	force.	The	first	reading,	however,	regards	the
withdrawal	agreement	as	determinative	as	soon	as	that	agreement	is	concluded,	even	if	it	enters	into	force	on	a
later	date,	i.e.	after	29	March	2019.	Which	reading	is	the	better	one?
We	think	that	there	are	strong	arguments	for	the	first	reading.	First,	‘that’	must	refer	to	the	existence	of	a
withdrawal	agreement,	rather	than	to	the	entry	into	force	of	one	such	agreement.	The	English	version	is	not
entirely	clear	in	that	respect,	nor	is	the	French,	German,	or	Spanish	one,	all	of	which	fail	to	define	what	precisely
“that”	refers	to.	The	Italian	and	Swedish	versions,	however,	clearly	support	such	an	interpretation	as	they	read
respectively	“in	mancanza	di	tale	accordo”	(‘failing	such	agreement’)	and	“om	det	inte	finns	något	sådant	avtal”	(‘if
there	is	no	such	agreement’).	If	the	two	years	were	supposed	to	set	the	maximum	period	for	the	withdrawal	to
actually	happen	(with	or	without	an	exit	agreement),	the	drafters	could	have	easily	specified	that	in	Article	50(3).
Second,	the	commentaries	to	the	various	(constitutional	treaty)	drafts	of	what	is	now	Article	50	make	clear	the
underlying	rationale	of	the	provision	on	withdrawal.	They	state	in	the	relevant	part:
“while	it	is	desirable	that	an	agreement	should	be	concluded	between	the	Union	and	the	withdrawing
State	on	the	arrangements	for	withdrawal	and	on	their	future	relationship,	it	was	felt	that	such	an
agreement	should	not	constitute	a	condition	for	withdrawal	so	as	not	to	void	the	concept	of	voluntary
withdrawal	of	its	substance”.
In	other	words,	the	ultimate	objective	of	Article	50	is	to	reach	an	agreement	on	withdrawal	to	ensure	an	orderly
exit,	while	the	two-year	deadline	is	there	to	reassure	the	withdrawing	Member	that	its	decision	to	withdraw	from
the	Union	will	not	be	ultimately	frustrated.	If	the	withdrawing	Member	and	the	Union	reach	agreement,	that
agreement	takes	precedence	–	even	where	it	stipulates	that	it	enters	into	force	after	the	two-year	period.
Accordingly,	the	interpretation	suggested	here	conforms	with	the	spirit	and	purpose	of	the	provision.
Rome	was	not	built	in	a	day.	Neither	was	the	EU.	Brexit	is	a	complicated,	complex	process	that	should	proceed
with	the	aim	of	finding	an	optimal	solution,	rather	than	a	quick	one.	The	transitional	framework	suggested	here
offers	an	additional	pragmatic	option.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	our	sister	site,	LSE	Brexit.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the
position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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